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AND NON-PARTICIPATING COUNTitiES IN STAGE THREE OF EMU 
Interim report to the :&uropeu Council Introduction 
1.  The process towards the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union is  now well 
underway.  Technical  preparations  have  reached  an  advanced  stage,  while  there  is 
also  progress  among  Member  States  in  achieving  a  high  degree  of sustainable 
convergen,ce.  Although  efforts  are  being  made  to  ensure  the  largest  possible 
participation in EMU from the outset,  it cannot be excluded that, at the start of the 
third stage, a certain number of Member States would not fully  participate  in  the 
monetary union. Although this is not a desirable situation, one should cater for this 
eventuality, which also has significance in view of future enlargement of the Union. 
The Treaty already provides for such a situation, defining the rights and obligations 
of those  countries.  However,  it does  not define  the  specific  nature  of the  future 
exchange  rate  relations  between  participating  and  non-participating  countries  in 
Stage  Three  of EMU.  Some  general  orientations  need to  be defined  in  order  to 
respond to the request made by the European Council in Cannes. 
2.  Irrespective  of which  Member  States  participate  in  monetary  union,  all  Member 
States will continue to share a wide common basis and they are all committed to the 
general  objectives  laid  down  in  the  Treaty  in  particular  the  promotion  of a  high 
degree  of convergence  of economic  performance.  It is  important to  reach  a clear 
consensus,  early  enough,  on the  general  orientations  for  the  future  exchange  rate 
relations between participating and non-participating countries. This will contribute 
to market stability. General orientations should be defined well in advance before the 
discussion starts on which countries are  ready to  move to the third stage of EMU, 
such that final  decisions on  the specific features  of exchange rate  relations can  be 
taken once the European Central Bank (ECB) is established, enabling any agreement 
to be fully operational at the start of stage three. 
3.  Any framework for exchange rate relations between non-participating countries and 
EMU countries should aim at:  (i)  contributing to  the convergence process of non-
participating Member States, (ii) ensuring the efficient and orderly functioning of  the 
single market through exchange rate stability. 
Legal/institutional framework 
4.  The  institutional/legal  framework  to  be  applied  to  the  decision  on,  and 
implementation of~ economic and monetary policies is the same for non-participating 
countries as  for  countries in  the monetary union,  with as  main exception rules and 
procedures  related  to  the  single  monetary  policy.  The  participating  and  non-
participating  countries  will  therefore  generally  be  subjected  to  common  rules  in 
terms of  economic policy making. 
5.  For Member States with a derogation, non-participation in the monetary union is  a 
transitional  phase  since  they  aim  towards  and  they  are  committed  to  joining the 
monetary union as soon as they fulfil the necessary conditions. As future members of 
the monetary union, they are interested in following as close as possible the path of 
countries participating in the monetary union. 
1 The current procedures for  coordination of general economic policies will continue 
to  apply  in  the  third  stage,  involving  both  participating  and  non-participating 
Member States.  All  Member States shall  participate in the definition of the broad 
guidelines for the economic policies of the Member States and of the Community 
and multilateral surveillance.  Furthermore,  all  Member States 1 will  have the legal 
obligation to avoid excessive government deficits and would continue to be subject 
to  the excessive deficit procedure.  Non-participating Member States will therefore 
participate fully in the economic union 
6.  The  non-participating countries and  the  EMU  countries will  have  close monetary 
relations. Their monetary policies will pursue the same objectives and their central 
banks will be independent2. The national central banks (NCBs) of non-participating 
countries will form part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and their 
statutes will have to comply with the Treaty3. Their Governors will be members of 
the ECB General  Council, which  is  responsible, inter alia,  for  the  monitoring and 
operational aspects of any exchange rate arrangement in stage three and for the co-
ordination  of  monetary  policies  between  the  monetary  union  and  the  non-
participating countries. Non-participating EU countries shall treat their exchange rate 
policy as a matter of common interest. 
7.  The Treaty implies (Articles  109m and  109j(l) and the associated Protocol on the 
convergence criteria) that as long as there are Member States not participating in the 
third stage of EMU, an exchange rate relationship between those countries and the 
participating group will  exist.  Firstly,  Article  109m of the  Treaty  states that each 
Member State shall treat its exchange rate policy as a matter of  common interest, and 
the article explicitly refers to the European Monetary System (EMS).  Secondly, the 
convergence criterion on exchange rate stability is defined, both in Article  I 09j  and 
in  the  corresponding  Protocol,  in  terms  of participation  in  the  exchange  rate 
mechanism (ERM) of the EMS  and  observance of the normal fluctuation margins, 
without tensions and without devaluing at its own initiative. The convergence criteria 
also  apply to  Member  States joining EMU  at  a  later  stage.  This  implies  that  an 
exchange rate mechanism must be in existence after the start of  stage three as long as 
there are Member States which do not participate. While the ERMIEMS arrangement 
is  mentioned  in  the  Treaty,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean that it  must retain  its 
current form. 
The expected situation for Member States not participating in  EMU with the  first 
group is that they would participate in the ERM at the latest at the start of  stage three 
of EMU.  Indeed, that would be the  logical  consequence of the  implementation of 
their  convergence  efforts.  The  three  years  left  before  I 999  should  allow  these 
countries to  reach a stable exchange rate situation resulting from an improved level 
of  convergence and sufficient credibility oftheir convergence processes. 
I.  Only  the  UK,  if it  choose not  to  participate,  would not have the  legally binding obligation in stage 
three  to  avoid  excessive  deficits.  Furthermore,  articles  104c(9)  and  (11)  do  not  apply  to  the  non-
participating Member States. 
2.  The  UK  is  the  only exception.  The  Independence of the  Bank of England  is  not  required  if and  as 
long as the UK chooses not  to participate. 
3.  As regards the Statures, see footnote 2. 
2 Situation at the start of stage three 
8.  Although a certain number of countries may not fulfil the convergence criteria on 
time for the deadline of 1999, they can be expected to have reached a good level of 
convergence.  This  would  allow a  large  measure of exchange  rate  stability  to  be 
reached and to be sustainable. Those countries would be close to joining monetary 
union.  While waiting for  it, they would normally be expected to  participate in  the 
ERM,  whatever  its  form.  The  fluctuation  margins  should  provide  them  enough 
flexibility  to  absorb  eventual  shocks  which  could  adversely  affect  (at  least 
temporarily) the convergence process. 
9.  The case of the  countries which have the right not to participate in the monetary 
union unless they decide otherwise (United Kingdom and Denmark), is specific.  If 
they are in a good situation in terms of convergence, their position would be very 
similar to the one described above for the countries with a derogation, allowing them 
to participate in the ERM. 
1  0.  Non-participating countries could gain credibility in their efforts to reduce inflation 
by fixing their exchange rate to a stable nominal anchor. Fixing the exchange rate to 
a  large  block  of  nominal  stability  could  provide  an  anchor  for  stabilising 
expectations and facilitate convergence in allowing a lower level of  interest rates. 
Key features of an exchange rate arrangement in stage three 
11.  Fostering convergence and preserving the orderly working of  the internal market are 
to be kept in mind when defining the key features of  an exchange rate arrangement. 
12.  Non-participating  countries  will  be  committed to  the  convergence  pr0cess,  since 
achieving a high degree of convergence is a general objective of the Treaty and the 
condition for being able to participate in the monetary union at a later stage. In the 
context of the third stage of EMU, the monetary union will play the leading role in 
terms  of  stable  economic  performance.  Therefore,  additional  efforts  towards 
achieving and maintaining the necessary convergence will mainly have to be made 
by the non-participating EU countries. 
An  exchange  rate  arrangement  can  reduce  the  uncertainty  concerning  the 
participation  in  the  monetary  union  and  it  can  reinforce  the  credibility  of the 
stability-oriented policies that the country concerned has to apply in order to reach a 
high degree of convergence.  Such an arrangement would reinforce the perception 
that non-participating countries are  not  left behind but rather  preparing their full 
participation. This would enhance confidence in their convergence process. 
13.  Any exchange rate arrangement between the monetary union and  non-participating 
countries should contribute to  avoid  excessive exchange rate  fluctuations  between 
the  single  currency  and  the  non-participating  currencies  which  would  lead  to 
disruptions in trade flows.  To this extent, exchange rate stability can be seen as a 
condition for the internal market to deliver its full potential in terms of  efficiency and 
growth. An exchange rate arrangement which would foster the adoption of stability-
oriented policies in non-participating countries, would reinforce their credibility and 
lead to greater exchange rate stability. 
3 Additional instruments for  promoting convergence, consistent with the Treaty and 
compatible with an exchange rate arrangement, could be considered. In any case, to 
be successful and to lead to greater stability, an exchange rate arrangement has to be 
underpinned by a strengthened convergence. 
14.  The definition of an exchange rate arrangement between the single currency and EU 
non-participating currencies should take into account the following principles: 
•  any exchange rate arrangement should provide a framework for the non-participating 
countries to prepare for their full participation in EMU. Irrespective of the number of 
participants, EMU should remain open for the others to be able to participate later on; 
•  the  exchange rate  arrangement should not disturb markets  and  should not interfere 
with the conduct of the single monetary policy. This principle would be particularly 
important  at  the  beginning  of the  third  stage,  when  the  ECB  starts  conducting 
monetary policy.  The primary objective of the monetary policy for  both groups of 
countries, price stability, must not be put at risk; 
•  the exchange rate arrangement needs to  be credible and  sustainable and it has to  be 
perceived as such by the markets. It has to contribute as  well to the conditioning of 
expectations towards stability. Two necessary conditions for this objective are:  (i) an 
appropriate institutional framework to  ensure that the system is able to provide the 
necessary  policy  responses,  and  (ii)  the  implementation  of convergence-oriented 
policies by the non-participating countries; 
•  it  should  be  a  Community  mechanism,  i.e.  designed  and  managed  within  the 
Community framework.  This  is  based on  a number of reasons:  (i)  the fact that the 
single currency would be at the centre of  the arrangement; (ii) the requirement to treat 
exchange rate policy of non-participating countries as  a matter of common interest; 
(iii) the fact that non-participating countries are fully involved in the economic union 
and they are members of the ESCB as  well; (iv) the need to support a convergence 
process leading to full participation in EMU. 
Conclusions 
15.  The Treaty implies that, as  long as there are Member States not participating in the 
third stage of EMU, an exchange rate arrangement between those countries and the 
participating group will exist. An early agreement on the main features  of such an 
arrangement will help to reduce uncertainty and contribute to market stability.  Any 
exchange rate arrangement should at the  same time assist the  convergence process 
and facilitate the efficient functioning of the internal market. In any case, to succeed 
in  stabilising  exchange  rates  an  arrangement  has  to  be  underpinned  by  stability 
oriented domestic policies. 
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